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MORE SENSE THAN MONEY: NATIONAL CHARTER OPTION FOR
FINTECH FIRMS IS THE RIGHT CHOICE
J. Parker Murphy*
The financial technology field is a rapidly growing sector that
threatens to disrupt established financial institutions and their
accompanying regulatory structure. New types of financial
services and products do not fit neatly into the current regulatory
landscape, which has hampered growth and competition with
traditional financial institutions. This article advances the idea
that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s recently
proposed special purpose national bank charter provides an
appropriate solution that protects consumers, encourages
innovation and competition, and moves the industry forward. First,
this article briefly describes the financial technology sector and
the scheme of national bank regulation. Second, the proposed
charter is put in context, examining the state and national
regulatory schemes currently monitoring the financial technology
industry. Lastly, this article evaluates the potential impact of a
special purpose national bank charter on consumers, regulatory
bodies, and financial technology companies themselves.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
When attempting to explain the explosive growth of the
financial technology sector (“fintech”), it is an understatement to
say that the industry has hit record highs in the past six months,
year, or even three years. Rather, fintech growth has been
astronomical and has consistently set and broken growth records,
despite a slowdown in billion-dollar mega-deals for 2016. 1 In
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law Class of 2018.
The author would like to express his gratitude to the NC JOLT staff and editors
for their insightful comments and feedback, especially Shannon O’Neil,
Carolina Poma, Linder Willeford, and Sam Helton. The author would also like
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2014, investment in the industry tripled over the previous year to a
stunning $12 billion. 2 Another evaluation showed that industry
investment grew from $17.8 billion to more than $38 billion
between 2014 and 2015.3 While it may be impossible to count the
exact number of fintech firms, Forbes notes that different estimates
put the number between 5,000 and 6,000 firms.4 Another reason it
can be so hard to quantify fintech’s explosive growth is due to the
diversity of industries encompassed by fintech. 5 Cryptocurrencies, 6 blockchain, 7 security, banking and payments, and
to thank Prof. Lissa Broome for her invaluable recommendations and
suggestions.
1
Julia Verhage, Trouble Brewing for Private Companies?, BLOOMBERG
MARKETS (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-1116/private-funding-for-fintech-firms-has-taken-a-tumble.
2
Call Levels, The State of Fintech Industry as We Know It Infographic,
FINTECH FINANCE (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.fintech.finance/01-news/the-stateof-fintech-industry-as-we-know-it-infographic/.
3
Jean Baptiste Su, The Global Fintech Landscape Reaches over 1000
Companies, $105B In Funding, $867B In Value: Report, FORBES (Sept. 28,
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeanbaptiste/2016/09/28/the-global-fintechlandscape-reaches-over-1000-companies-105b-in-funding-867b-in-valuereport/#41f7b52a4e86.
4
Falguin Desai, Fintech Startups Face Difficult Market Ahead, FORBES (Jan.
4, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/falgunidesai/2016/01/04/fintech-startupsface-difficult-market-ahead/#48d614e13145.
5
Larry D. Wall, Avoiding Regulation: FinTech versus the Sharing Economy,
FED.
RES.
BANK
ATLANTA
(Sept.
2016),
https://frbatlanta.org/cenfis/publications/notesfromthevault/09-avoidingregulation-fintech-versus-the-sharing-economy-2016-09-29.
“Financial
technology companies are generally startups founded with the purpose of
disrupting incumbent financial systems and corporations that rely less on
software.”
(citing
Fintech
Definition,
FINTECH
WEEKLY,
https://www.fintechweekly.com/fintech-definition (last visited Apr. 4, 2017)).
6
Crypto-currency can be defined as “a currency underpinned by technological
surety as opposed to a central bank.” Robert Churcher & Louise Perfect, A
Beginner’s Guide to FinTech: Navigating the Jargon, PWC (May 11, 2016),
http://pwc.blogs.com/megatrend_matters/2016/05/a-beginners-guide-to-fintechnavigating-the-jargon.html.
7
“Blockchain, generally speaking, is used to create public ledgers of
transactions and distribute them in a decentralized manner to several computers,
making it just about impossible to hack and change all the recorded versions of
the data.” Natalie Rodriguez, An Inside Look At A Law Firm Diving Into Bitcoin
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insurance are just a few8 of the categories that make up the fintech
landscape. 9 Several popular companies, such as Square,
LendingClub, and Social Finance, Inc. (“SoFi”) are all valued
above $6 billion.10 By some measures, Paypal (which owns the
popular peer-to-peer payment 11 company Venmo) holds more
customer deposits than all but twenty U.S. banks.12
The growth of this industry, combined with the large amount of
consumer funds that some fintech companies hold, has raised
Tech, LAW360 (March 10, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/769691/aninside-look-at-a-law-firm-diving-into-bitcoin-tech. Blockchain is the underlying
technology for crypto-currencies, as well as smart contracts “that can
automatically execute payments upon validating ownership information or
recognizing a trigger event using online information.” Id. For a more detailed
explanation of bitcoin and blockchain technology, see Marco Santori et al., How
Blockchain Will Revolutionize Commercial Transactions, LAW360 (May, 12,
1016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/794611/how-blockchain-willrevolutionize-commercial-transactions.
8
For a broader view of the different sub-sectors that make up FinTech, as well
as an overview of the disruptive impact of FinTech on the financial services
industry as a whole, see generally Blurred Lines: How FinTech is Shaping
Financial Services, PWC (Mar. 2016), http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/advisoryservices/FinTech/pwc-fintech-global-report.pdf.
9
Su, supra note 3.
10
Call Levels, supra note 2. SoFi has recently partnered with the ABA to
market directly to law students who may have an interest in refinancing their
loans, touting their loan volume of $13B+ for over 200,000 borrowers. See SoFi
Student
Loan
Refinancing,
AMERICAN
BAR
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.abainsurance.com/personal-programs/student-loanrefinancing/?utm_source=
Listrak&utm_medium=Email&utm_term=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.abainsurance
.com%2Fpersonal-programs%2Fstudent-loanrefinancing%2F&utm_campaign=Student+Loans+%26+the+Benefits+of+Refin
ancing (last visited Mar. 17, 2017).
11
Peer to peer payment services allow individuals to send each other money
“from their mobile devices through a linked debit card” or bank account. Those
funds are then stored in an account that can disperse funds to other individuals
or banks. See generally Amber Murkakami-Fester, Venmo, PayPal, Square
Cash and More: What Are Peer-to-Peer Payments?, NERDWALLET (Oct. 21,
2016), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/banking/p2p-payment-systems/.
12
Telis Demos, PayPal Isn’t a Bank, But It May Be the New Face of Banking,
WALL STREET J. (June 1, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/as-bankingevolves-fintech-emerges-from-the-branch-1464806411.
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concerns. Particularly, money held by many of these firms is not
protected or backstopped 13 by the federal government’s deposit
insurance, as only banks can hold deposits.14 This potential risk to
consumers, combined with an increase in the number of bank-like
activities, has led various governmental agencies in the U.S. to
address concerns about instability in the financial system and the
insecurity of consumer funds. Recently, the White House under
President Obama published a white paper entitled “A Framework
for Fintech,” 15 outlining “widely-shared values and practical
expectations for the financial services sector . . . .” 16 The ten
enumerated principles focused on consumers, maximizing
transparency, promoting financial inclusion and health, and
protecting financial stability. 17 Similarly, the federal banking
regulator of nationally chartered banks, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), announced it would
consider issuing formal bank charters to online lenders, payment
13

“The FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933, commonly referred to
as the Glass-Steagall Act, to maintain public confidence in the banking system
by, among other things, insuring bank deposits within a specified limit.” Paul T.
Clark, Just Passing Through: A History and Critical Analysis of FDIC
Insurance of Deposits Held by Brokers and Other Custodians, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 99, 100 (2012–2013). “Deposit insurance is intended to
instill confidence in depositors by assuring them that their deposits are safe
regardless of the financial condition of their bank.” Id. at 168.
14
See generally Demos, supra note 12.
15
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, A FRAMEWORK FOR FINTECH, WHITE
HOUSE
(2017),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/files
/documents/A%20Framework%20for%20FinTech%20_FINAL.pdf.
While
President Obama’s directives in this area may have signaled one approach,
President Trump’s new administration will be able to pick the next Comptroller
of Currency, and may decide to take a wholly different approach to fintech
companies. See Trump’s Chance to Redefine the Regulators, WALL STREET J.
(Jan.
18,
2017),
http://graphics.wsj.com/Who-are-the-financialregulators/?mod=e2tw.
16
Id.
17
Id. While these principles are subject to change with a new incoming
President, the white paper provides an outline of the potential considerations the
federal government faces when attempting to deal with the growing and
disruptive industry.
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companies, and other fintech firms.18 This special purpose national
bank charter (previously used to authorize credit card banks)19
would require any firms who elected to seek a charter to conform
to a formal system of federal regulation, instead of having to
comply with a patchwork of state regulation by partnering with
chartered financial institutions.20
While some commenters argue that government regulation will
only create uncertainty in a growing industry,21 fintech companies,
like Circle Internet Financial,22 have requested increased regulation
and security in order to increase the ease of doing business
nationally due to uniformity of laws and regulations. 23 Fintech
companies will continue to reduce costs associated with
borrowing, improve the quality of financial services, harness the
18

James Rufus Koren, ‘Fintech’ Firms Notch Win as Regulator Allows Them
to Seek Federal Bank Charters, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fintech-charters-20161202-story.html.
19
Credit card banks are national banks limited to the issuance of credit cards
to customers. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EXPLORING
SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (Dec.
2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/bankoperations/innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-forfintech.pdf [hereinafter Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for
Fintech Companies].
20
Rachel Witkowski & Telis Demos, Fintech Startup Craves More
Regulation,
WALL
STREET
J.
(June
9,
2016),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fintech-startup-craves-more-regulation1465517775. Currently, many companies are forced to rely on relationships with
currently chartered banks or engage in state-by-state compliance in order to
issue loans. Id.
21
Rohit Arora, Government Should Think Before Imposing Regulation on
Fintech,
TECHCRUNCH
(Aug.
2,
2015),
https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/02/government-should-think-before-imposingheavy-regulation-on-fintech/ (arguing regulators should create clarity, not more
regulation, in order to lower the cost of administering critical credit for
underserved markets and increase transparency).
22
Circle Internet Financial, or simply “Circle,” is a payments processing
company that uses open Internet standards and protocols (including blockchain)
to make “online payments easier to use, safer and more convenient than ever.”
About, CIRCLE INTERNET FINANCIAL LIMITED, https://www.circle.com/en/about
(last visited Apr. 4, 2017).
23
Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20.
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power of data-driven analytics for assessing risk, and create a more
diverse and stable credit landscape. 24 Additionally, the OCC
believes that fintech companies will continue to drive changes in
financial services to “reach unbanked and underserved populations,
[and] make products and services safer and more efficient . . . .”25
These improvements will likely continue regardless of a charter
offering for fintech firms, and consumers and small business
owners across the country stand to benefit from a new age in
banking that is more accessible and inclusive than ever.
This Recent Development argues that a special purpose bank
charter would benefit both consumers and the financial services
industry by subjecting larger fintech companies to increased
scrutiny and regulation. A more cohesive scheme of regulations
would create improved transparency, competition, and consumer
protection, while reducing the limiting effect of the current stateby-state regulatory scheme on fintech companies. Part II of this
recent development provides a brief overview of the scheme of
national bank regulation, including the role of the OCC, the value
of special purpose bank charters, and the OCC’s statutory authority
for creating new bank charters. Part III examines the costs and
benefits of current regulation of the fintech industry, focusing on
institutions that specialize in lending or other activities that often
attract increased regulatory scrutiny. Lastly, Part IV evaluates the
potential of a specified bank charter for fintech firms, including the
benefits and risks that would accompany it. Despite concerns
leveled by state banks and other institutions that would be
adversely impacted by a charter for fintech firms, such a charter
would provide better management of the unique risks present in the
industry, increase transparency, and better protect consumers while
24

The Fintech Revolution: A Wave of Startups is Changing Finance for the
Better,
THE
ECONOMIST
(May
9,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21650546-wave-startups-changingfinancefor-better-fintech-revolution.
25
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Remarks Regarding Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies, at 2 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf.
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also providing enhanced services for consumers and small business
owners.
II.

EXPLANATION OF THE FEDERAL BANK REGULATORY
SYSTEM AND THE OCC
The federal government provides regulatory oversight for the
banking and securities markets of the United States in order to
protect borrowers and investors that participate in those markets.26
Financial regulation is designed to mitigate financial instability
through the promulgation of rules for specific types of institutions
and behaviors.27 The responsibility of overseeing major financial
institutions like banks is divided amongst several federal agencies
whose duties sometimes overlap with state level regulatory
authority. The parallel federal and state banking systems that coexist in the United States give potential banks the option of
chartering under federal law and regulation, or state law and
regulation. 28 Both banking systems provide “different, positive
contributions to the overall strength of the U.S. banking system.”29
This section will provide a brief overview of the federal regulatory
scheme, the structure of special purpose banks, and how financial
technology companies would fit into the federal regulatory scheme
under a special purpose charter.
A. Outline of the Federal Bank Regulatory System
The OCC currently serves as the primary federal regulator for
national banks, federal savings associations, and federal branches
26

EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43087, WHO REGULATES
WHOM AND HOW? AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY POLICY FOR
BANKING
AND
SECURITIES
MARKETS
(2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43087.pdf.
27
Id.
28
See generally OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NATIONAL
BANKS
AND
THE
DUAL
BANKING
SYSTEM,
(Sept.
2003),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publicationsreports/national-banks-and-the-dual-banking-system.pdf [hereinafter National
Banks and the Dual Banking System].
29
Id.
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of foreign banks30 and has the power to grant charters for those
companies under the National Bank Act31 and Home Owners’ Loan
Act.32 Banks that elect state charters are regulated by their statelevel regulator and also by a federal regulator: either the Federal
Reserve Board (“FRB”) for state banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System, or Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) for state non-member banks. 33 The OCC conducts
examinations by analyzing loan and investment portfolios, capital,
assets, funds management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to
market risk. 34 Additionally, the OCC can take supervisory
enforcement action against any bank it supervises that does not
comply with the law or regulations issued by the OCC in the form
of monetary penalties or required remedial actions.35
The OCC has the power to grant charters for national banks
under the National Bank Act,36 and will approve charter proposals
that “will provide fair access to financial services; will ensure
compliance with laws and regulations; will promote fair treatment
30

About the OCC, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-about.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter About the OCC].
31
See 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2012).
32
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1461 (2012). The OCC also has authority, under the
International Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3102, to license a foreign bank to
operate a federal branch or agency in the United States. See Exploring Special
Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies, supra note 19.
33
See generally Who Regulates My Bank?, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY,
https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/national-banks/nationalbanks.html, (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Who Regulates My Bank?].
34
About the OCC, supra note 30.
35
Enforcement Actions, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
https://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-regulations/enforcement-actions/indexenforcement-actions.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Enforcement
Actions]; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818 (2012) (Cease and Desist
Orders), 1818(i)(2) (Civil Money Penalty Orders), 1831o (2012) (Prompt
Corrective Action Directives).
36
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S
LICENSING
MANUAL:
CHARTERS
50
(2016),
https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensingmanuals/charters.pdf [hereinafter Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters].
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of customers; and will foster healthy competition.”37 The OCC
considers whether the proposed bank has competent management,
sufficient capital, will be operated in a safe and sounds manner,
poses acceptable risk to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, and
demonstrates that its corporate powers are consistent with the
purposes of federal savings associations,38 federal savings banks,39
or national banks.40 The OCC has stated that “the business of
banking develops over time as the economy and business methods
evolve,”41 and also has the authority to determine what activities
are permissible for national banks.42 Specifically, the OCC believes
that it “has the legal authority to construe these activities to include
bank-permissible, technology-based innovations in financial
services.”43
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United
States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system. . . .” 44 The Act implemented changes affecting
the oversight and supervision of financial institutions, created the

37

Id.
See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012).
39
Id.
40
See 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e), (f) (2017) (outlining factors the OCC considers
when reviewing a charter application).
41
Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies,
supra note 19.
42
See generally NationsBank of N.C., v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513
U.S. 251 (1995); M&M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat’l Bank, 563 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 987 (1978); OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC CONDITIONAL APPROVAL NO. 267
(January 12, 1998), https://www.occ.gov/static/bit/ca267.pdf (certification
authority and repository and key escrow are part of the business of banking);
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC INTERPRETIVE LETTER
NO. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (allowing national banks to purchase and sell financial
futures for their own account).
43
Id.
44
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
38
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),45 provided for a
new resolution procedure for large financial companies, and
reformed the regulation of credit rating agencies.46 While many of
the changes made by Dodd-Frank did not directly affect special
purpose charters or financial technology companies, the Act
signaled a renewed focus on protecting the stability of the financial
system and ensured that large institutions or new products could
not have a destabilizing effect on the economy. 47 Increased
concerns about stability may cause some regulators in the financial
services industry to see new, untested products or financial entities
as a risk to that stability, especially if they could affect the
financial industry on a national level. 48 This perspective could
generate opposition to the potential entry of fintech companies into
the federal banking system. However, the former chief counsel of
the OCC believed that current institutions will recognize the value
of competition, and “balance their support for technical
innovation” with “safety-and-soundness-based caution.”49
45

The CFPB is a federal agency responsible for implementing and enforcing
compliance with consumer finance laws. See The Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCE
PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/
(last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
46
The Dodd-Frank Act: A Cheat Sheet, MORRISON & FOERSTER (2010),
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf.
47
Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen recently remarked, “Dodd-Frank
placed considerable emphasis on financial stability . . . ” and also affirmed that
the recent financial crisis has led to a higher priority on safeguards and
supervisions that result in a “ . . . safer and sounder financial system.” Amanda
Schiavo, Fed Chari Yellen Why Banks Need Dodd-Frank, THE STREET (Nov. 17,
2016),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/13898085/1/fed-chair-janet-yellen-ithink-dodd-frank-was-very-important.html.
48
See, e.g., Szu Ping Chan, Fintech ‘Boom’ Risks Fresh ‘Bust’ If Left
Unchecked, Warns Carney, THE TELEGRAPH (Jan. 25, 2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/25/fintech-boom-risks-fresh-bustleft-unchecked-warns-carney/ (arguing global regulators should monitor
developments in fintech closely to avoid boom and bust cycles).
49
Gregory Roberts, Ex-OCC Counsel Predicts Caution From Regulators on
Fintech, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 9, 2016), https://www.bna.com/exocccounsel-predicts-n57982073852/. Julie Williams served as chief counsel for the
OCC for nineteen years before leaving in 2012, and later joined Promontory
Financial Group in Washington, DC. Id.
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B. Special Purpose National Banks
The OCC also offers a separate special purpose bank charter.
Special purpose banks “must engage in fiduciary activities or
provide at least one of following banking services: receiving
deposits; paying checks; or lending money.”50 On March 15, 2017,
the OCC issued a document entitled “A Draft Licensing Manual
Supplement for Evaluating Charter Applications from Financial
Technology Companies.”51 In an explanation of the document, the
OCC stated that it anticipates that special purpose national banks
will “elect to demonstrate that they are engaged in paying checks
or lending money.”52 Additionally, the OCC noted, “issuing debit
cards or engaging in other means of facilitating payments
electronically may be considered the modern equivalent of paying
checks.”53
Traditionally the special purpose bank, while bound by many
of the same restrictions on standard national bank charters, “may
offer only a small number of products, target a limited customer
base, incorporate nontraditional elements, or have narrowly
targeted business plans.”54 Whereas national banks are generally
authorized by their articles of associations or charters to exercise
all express or implied powers of their respective charter, the OCC
may require a business seeking a special purpose charter to specify
50

Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to
Fintech Companies, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occto-issue-special-purpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/. See also
12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1) (2014).
51
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, EVALUATING CHARTER
APPLICATIONS FROM FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (Mar. 2017),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensingmanuals/file-pub-lm-fintech-licensing-manual-supplement.pdf
[hereinafter
Evaluating Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies].
52
OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC SUMMARY OF
COMMENTS AND EXPLANATORY STATEMENT: SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL
BANK CHARTERS FOR FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (Mar. 2017),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/summary-explanatorystatement-fintech-charters.pdf.
53
Id.
54
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36.
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in more detail the activities in which it plans to be engaged.55
Businesses that are granted special purpose charters are not
permitted to deviate from those activities without prior OCC
approval.56
Fintech firms may be subject to other federal laws including
the Bank Secrecy Act,57 Electronic Funds Transfer Act,58 Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act,59 Equal Credit Opportunity Act,60 Fair
Housing Act,61 Fair Credit Reporting Act,62 Truth in Lending Act,63
and any economic sanctions levied by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control.64 Fintech firms that obtain a special purpose national bank
charter from the OCC would be subject to laws regarding legal
lending limits, restrictions on transactions with affiliates, and
insider-lending requirements. 65 Although the OCC Whitepaper 66
doesn’t touch upon it, special purpose national banks are “subject
to the Change in Bank Control Act, which would require that any
55

David F. Freeman, Jr. et al., OCC Unveils Its Plan to Charter FinTech
Companies as Special Purpose National Banks, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE
SCHOLER
LLP
(Dec.
6,
2016),
http://www.apks.com/en/perspectives/publications/2016/12/occ-unveils-its-planto-charter-fintech.
56
Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies,
supra note 19.
57
31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5330 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(s), 1829(b), 1951–
1959; 31 C.F.R. §103 (2014); 31 C.F.R. Chapter X (2014).
58
15 U.S.C. § 1693b (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 205 (2014).
59
12 U.S.C. § 2801 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1003 (2014).
60
15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1002 (2014).
61
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619 (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 100 (2014).
62
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 222 (2014).
63
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2014).
64
31 C.F.R. Chapter V (2014).
65
Lawrence D. Kaplan et al., The OCC’s Proposed Fintech Charter: If It
Walks Like a Bank and Quacks Like a Bank, It’s a Bank, PAUL HASTINGS (Dec.
13,
2016)
https://www.paulhastings.com/publicationsitems/details/?id=2b1eeb69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded#_edn13 (citing 12
U.S.C. § 84 (2014) and 12 C.F.R. § 32 (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1(2012)
and 12 C.F.R. § 223 (2014); and 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a(a)–(b) (2012) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 215 (2014)).
66
See Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies, supra note 19.
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person acquiring control of a Fintech Bank obtain prior OCC
approval after at least a 60-day public notice and comment
period.”67
The most common example of an institution that is chartered
under a special purpose charter is a credit card bank, which is
primarily concerned with issuing credit cards and generating credit
card receivables.68 Credit card banks traditionally engage only in a
limited amount of activities, and “offer a small number of
products, target a limited customer case, incorporate nontraditional
elements, or have narrowly targeted business plans.”69 The Federal
Reserve Board usually subjects companies that own credit card
banks to additional supervision and oversight, but there are
exceptions under the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(“CEBA”). 70 Not only must such credit card banks meet
requirements for creation under the CEBA amendment71 to the
Bank Holding Company Act (“BHCA”),72 they must also become
insured depository institutions73 and apply for membership in the
Federal Reserve System.74 Furthermore, since credit card banks are
highly specialized and may pose risks that do not typically occur in
consumer and commercial banking operations, the OCC may
impose a number of additional requirements.75 The OCC may also
67

Kaplan et al., supra note 65 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j) (2012); 12 C.F.R.
§ 5.50 (2014)).
68
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36 at 51.
69
Id.
70
Id.; see also 12 C.F.R. 225.145 (2017).
71
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, PL100-86, Sect. 101, August
10, 1987, 101 Stat 552.
72
See 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F) (2012).
73
12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2) (defining insured depository institutions as “any
bank or savings association the deposits of which are insured by the Corporation
pursuant to this chapter”).
74
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36; see 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.145 (2017).
75
Those requirements can include maintaining a specific minimum capital
floor, a certain percentage of tier 1 capital (leverage ratio), and developing a
business contingency plan in case the bank does not achieve original business
plan results. See Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36; 12
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require an operating agreement between the special purpose bank
and the OCC establishing minimum requirements regarding
capital, liquidity, corporate governance, risk-management, and
other items.76
C. Special Purpose Bank Charters for Fintech Companies
In light of the substantial historical background of special
purpose banks, the OCC “views the National Bank Act as
sufficiently adaptable to permit national banks—full-service or
special purpose—to engage in new activities as part of the business
of banking or to engage in traditional activities in new ways.”77 In
its recent white paper on potential charters for fintech businesses,
the OCC notes that special purpose banks are subject to the same
laws, regulations, examination, reporting requirements, and
ongoing supervision as national banks.78 Additionally, state law
applies to special purpose banks to the same extent as to national
banks, and including limits on state visitorial authority.79 While the
OCC is the primary federal regulator, all national banks are
required to be members of the Federal Reserve System.80 If fintech
companies were to become chartered national banks, statutes and
regulations enforced by the Federal Reserve Board on member
banks would also apply to fintech firms. 81 The Bank Holding
Company Act (“BHCA”) could also apply to a fintech company in
U.S.C. § 1818 (2012) (termination of status as insured depository institution); 12
C.F.R. § 225.145 (2017).
76
See Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36 at 54; see 12
C.F.R. § 225.145 (2017).
77
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36. See, e.g., 12
CFR § 7.5002 (OCC regulation authorizing national banks to use electronic
means to conduct activities they are otherwise authorized to conduct, subject to
appropriate safety and soundness and compliance standards and conditions).
78
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36.
79
Id. However, this second statement about state visitorial power may be less
likely in light of Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C., 557 U.S. 519, 523,
129 S. Ct. 2710, 2714 (2009).
80
See 12 U.S.C. § 222 (2012).
81
For example, the Federal Reserve Act imposes quantitative and qualitative
restrictions on a member bank’s transactions with its affiliates. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 371c–371c-1 (2012).
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the business of offering consumer financial products that has a
corporate structure that includes parents and subsidiaries. 82
Accordingly, the BCHA would apply “if [the parent company]
controls a special purpose national bank that is a ‘bank’ for
purposes of the BHCA—that is, the bank is FDIC—insured or
accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans.” 83
However, similar to credit card banks that were exempted from the
BHC, fintech firms under a special purpose national bank charter
could similarly be exempted.84 The OCC notes that other regulators
such as the FDIC and CFPB may supervise national banks, which
would work in tandem to regulate the special purpose bank.85
Some industry bodies have voiced opposition to the OCC’s
potential move to grant charters to fintech companies, with most
complaints coming from the Conference of State Bank Supervisors
(“CSBS”), an organization of state bank regulators.86 The CSBS
argues to the OCC that Section 5.20(e)(1)(i) of the OCC’s
chartering regulations “exceeds the statutory limits of the OCC’s
chartering authority by authorizing the OCC to charter an
82

See Lawrence D. Kaplan et al., The OCC’s Proposed Fintech Charter: If It
Walks Like a Bank and Quacks Like a Bank, It’s a Bank, PAUL HASTINGS (Dec.
13,
2016)
https://www.paulhastings.com/publicationsitems/details/?id=2b1eeb69-2334-6428-811c-ff00004cbded.
83
Michael Nonaka, OCC to Issue Special Purpose National Bank Charters to
Fintech Companies, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REGULATION (Dec. 11, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/11/occto-issue-special-purpose-national-bank-charters-to-fintech-companies/.
84
See Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, PL100-86, Sect. 101,
August 10, 1987, 101 Stat 552 (exempting credit card banks from BHCA
coverage); For a more in-depth discussion of the BHCA treatment of fintech
firms chartered under a special purpose national bank charter, see Fannie Chen,
Beyond FinTech: The OCC’s Special Purpose National Bank Charter, DAVIS
POLK
&
WARDWELL
LLP
(Dec.
9,
2016),
https://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/2016-129_occs_special_purpose_national_bank_charter.pdf.
85
Comptroller’s Licensing Manual: Charters, supra note 36, at 6–8.
86
Jim Kurtze, Statement by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors on
Comptroller’s Announcement of New Federal Charters, CONFERENCE OF STATE
BANK SUPERVISORS (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.csbs.org/news/pressreleases/pr2016/Pages/120216.aspx.
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institution that engages exclusively in non-depository core banking
functions—whether lending money and/or paying checks.” 87
Additionally, the CSBS maintains that “the creation of a new
charter type for an institution engaged exclusively in lending
money or paying checks would massively preempt otherwise
applicable State licensing and consumer protection laws,”88 which
is a key benefit from the perspective of fintech firms. These
arguments89 could signal the possibility of a legal challenge to any
OCC attempt to grant charters to fintech companies, which could
considerably delay any possibility of a charter being awarded to
any interested fintech company. Any legal challenge could tie up
the OCC in months or years of litigation, which would forestall or
prevent the OCC’s rollout of an OCC charter and would leave
fintech firms in an uncertain position while attempting to navigate
a fragmented regulatory scheme. Additionally, the Trump
administration will appoint a new Comptroller of the Currency in
April 2017, and that individual may be more persuaded by the
states’ rights argument.90
87

John W. Ryan, Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks, Proposed
Rule; Docket ID OCC-2016-0017, CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS
(Nov.
14,
2016),
https://www.csbs.org/regulatory/policy/Documents/2016/CSBS%20Comment%
20Letter%20on%20OCC%20Receiverships%20for%20Uninsured%20National
%20Banks%20NPRM.pdf. At least one court has taken a similar position. See
Independent Bankers Ass’n of America v. Conover, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22529, at *34 -36 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 1985) (IBAA v. Conover) (holding that an
institution which does not engage in both accepting deposits and making loans
cannot be chartered as a national bank because it would not be engaged in the
“business of banking” within the meaning of the National Bank Act).
88
Ryan, supra note 87.
89
See, e.g., Joel Stashenko, NY Regulator Slams Plan for Federal Fintech
Bank
Charter,
N.Y.
L.
J.
(Jan.
18,
2017),
www.newyorklawjournal.com/home/id=1202777069796/NY-Regulator-SlamsPlan-for-Federal-Fintech-BankCharter?mcode=1202617075062&curindex=0&slreturn=20170018213441.
90
See Liz Hoffman et al., Steven Mnuchin’s OneWest Lieutenant Is
Considered for Comptroller Job, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 16, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/steven-mnuchins-onewest-lieutenant-isconsidered-for-comptroller-job-1487208755.
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III.

THE CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE FOR FINTECH
FIRMS
Without the option to apply for a national charter, fintech firms
that want to operate in different states across the country (to say
nothing of international markets) are required to sort through both
federal and state regulatory schemes. 91 While the dual-charter
system usually allows for financial institutions to benefit from a
coherent regulatory framework at one level or the other, fintech
companies are forced to deal with regulations and laws at both
levels.92 This complexity makes it difficult for fintech companies to
create coherent policies and practices in short periods of time,
especially given the limited budget or small size of many young
fintech firms and the cost and complexity of creating those
policies.93 Additionally, many of the applicable regulations were
created before today’s Internet dependent world, which poses
another obstacle for companies attempting to grow and scale
products. Fintech firms have attempted to navigate this complex
landscape through a variety of approaches, including bank
partnerships, hiring senior ex-regulators, and utilizing new
regulation technology tools. 94 This section will provide an
overview of the ways fintech firms currently attempt to deal with
91

SEC Commissioner Michael Piwowar recently observed that innovation in
the U.S. is often hindered by a fragmented “alphabet soup” regulatory structure.
Tom Zanki, SEC Chair Says Investors Need Info For Fintech To Flourish, LAW
360 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/862229/sec-chair-saysinvestors-need-info-for-fintech-to-flourish Piwowar also said that, “The great
potential of fintech should not be hindered by our current regulatory structure.”
Id.
92
See Brian Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work,
MERCATUS
CTR.,
GEORGE
MASON
U.
(Sept.
6,
2016),
https://www.mercatus.org/expert_commentary/why-state-state-fintechoversight-doesnt-work [hereinafter Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech
Oversight Doesn’t Work].
93
See id. (complying with state by state regulation is expensive and time
consuming, and “a massive disadvantage to young companies trying to compete
with incumbents”).
94
See generally Peter Rudegeair, Online Lender Avant Names Sheila Bair to
Board, WALL STREET J., Apr. 1, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/onlinelender-avant-names-sheila-bair-to-board-1459503001.
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regulatory issues, a more detailed analysis of the issues facing
fintech firms and the financial industry as a whole, and conclude
with an analysis of the benefits and drawbacks of the current
regulatory landscape.
A. Overview of Current Approaches to Regulatory Challenges
Most fintech firms are startup companies funded by venture
capital firms or other private funding options.95 Their goal is to
innovate in a segment of the financial sector like peer-to-peer
payments or lending. 96 However, this means that the teams
attempting to create a regulatory compliance model for their
companies are often small compared to the vast resources available
to more traditional financial institutions.97 The current regulatory
system requires varied approaches for the different industries in
which the fintech companies exist. While financial technology
includes everything from insurance to crowd funding, the majority
of current regulatory concern seems focused on lending. 98
Consumer advocates, in addition to federal and state regulators, are
especially concerned about the potential for unfair, deceptive, or
abusive lending practices that have been present in other
industries.99 In the aftermath of Dodd-Frank, significant regulatory
95

See Vitas Argimon, The New Wave of Partnership Models Between Banks
and Fintech Startups, CTR. FOR FIN. INCLUSION (Sept. 8, 2016), https://cfiblog.org/2016/09/08/the-new-wave-of-partnership-models-between-banks-andfintech-startups/.
96
Regulatory Guidance Regarding FinTech Products and Services, SULLIVAN
&
CROMWELL,
LLP
(Apr.
5,
2016),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Regulatory_G
uidance_Regarding_ FinTech_Products_and_Services.pdf.
97
Nicholas Elliott, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL
STREET
J.:
RISK
&
COMPLIANCE
J.
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-isstruggling-with-regulation/.
98
Id.
99
James Rufus Koren, Online Lenders Drawing More Scrutiny by Regulators,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-onlinelending-regulations-20160309-story.html. See James Rufus Koren, Toyota Will
Compensate Black and Asian Borrowers to Settle Bias Investigation, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-toyota-settlement-
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loopholes were closed, but the legislation also significantly
increased the compliance costs of financial institutions. 100 This
increased regulatory scrutiny, combined with an already complex
regulatory scheme has led fintech companies to seek a variety of
solutions in order to maintain growth and remain competitive.101
The most popular approach utilized by fintech firms involves
joining forces with other banks and creating a cooperative
agreement, sometimes referred to as a bank partnership. 102 For
example, Circle Internet Financial, a digital payment company, has
been forced to team up with institutions like Barclays to provide
accounts for its mobile app.103 While relationships like these may
be less than ideal due to reliance on outside partners for business
plan viability, “the bank partnership model has two big advantages
if structured properly: (1) no lender licenses for the platform
company and (2) interest may be charged uniformly nationwide at
rates that may not be permitted for direct lenders.” 104 OCC
regulations allow national banks “located in any state charge
20160202-story.html (reporting that Toyota paid as much as $21.9 million to
black and Asian borrowers who paid more for auto loans than whites).
100
See Bart van Liebergen, et al., Regtech in Financial Services: Solutions for
Compliance and Reporting, INST. INT’L FIN. (Mar. 22, 2016),
https://www.iif.com/publication/research-note/regtech-financial-servicessolutions-compliance-and-reporting.
101
See, e.g., Mike Whalen, Bank Partnership or Go It Alone?, GOODWIN
PROCTER, LLP (Aug. 23, 2016),
http://www.goodwinlaw.com/viewpoints/2016/08/08_23_16-bank-partnershipor-go-it-alone (exploring bank partnerships as a potential solution for the risk
posed by fintech companies acting as direct lenders).
102
Alessio Botta et al., New Partnership Models in Transaction Banking, 8
MCKINSEY
PAYMENTS
11
(May
2015),
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/newpartnership-models-in-transaction-banking. “Without national banking licenses,
startups are forced either to team up with banks or scale back their ambitions.”
Telis Demos and Rachel Witkowski, States to Feds: Back Off on New Fintech
Bank Plan, WALL STREET J. (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.wsj.com/articles/statesto-feds-back-off-on-new-fintech-bank-plan-1484132401.
103
Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20.
104
Whalen, supra note 101.
http://www.goodwinlaw.com/viewpoints/2016/08/08_23_16-bank-partnershipor-go-it-alone.
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interest at the maximum rate permitted to any state-chartered or
licensed lending institution by the law of that state,” which is
commonly known as interest rate exportation.105 Several different
kinds of cooperative approaches exist, namely outsourcing
partnerships in addition to investment and acquisition
agreements. 106 Partnerships occur when banks outsource
operations, either in part (also known as white-labeling) or in full,
to a fintech startup that bears the regulatory risk.107 The opposite
can also occur, like in the case of Circle Internet Financial, when
the fintech firm takes advantage of the regulatory position of a
bank. Sometimes banks use venture capital funds to encourage the
development of financial technology, and invest or acquire fintech
companies (or simply specific technologies or personnel).108 Lastly,
some banks will innovate internally, by funding and building
solutions that are integrated with their other operations.109
While financial technology companies or banks may use these
partnerships to gain access to new markets or continue expansion,
the partnership agreements can also be established in order to
protect existing relationships and customer bases. 110 These
agreements allow banks to harmonize customer experiences and
integrate platforms and processes, while dealing with the struggles
that come with multiple regulatory regimes and the digitization of
the financial services industry. 111 While bank partnerships may
seem less than optimal for fintech companies, the agreements
create positive benefits for both sides of the transaction.112 Fintech

105
12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(b) (2014) (authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2012)); see
also 12 U.S.C. § 25b(f) (2012).
106
Argimon, supra note 95 (explaining specific kinds of cooperative
partnership agreements).
107
See Botta et al., supra note 102.
108
Argimon, supra note 95.
109
Id.
110
Botta et al., supra note 102.
111
Id.
112
See Rob Nichols, Bank or No Bank, Fintech Must be Regulated,
AMERICAN
BANKER
(Feb.
18,
2016),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/bank-or-no-bank-fintech-must-be-
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operations give banks fast and iterative approaches to innovation,
without the need to expend large amount of capital.113 On the other
side of the relationship, banks deliver fintech firms access to large
customer bases, important real-world infrastructure, and big data.114
Both parties benefit from improved customer experiences and
trust, while cutting costs and increasing revenue in many cases.115
While bank partnerships have worked for some fintech firms,
larger entities like Square, Inc. and Lending Club who may try to
navigate the regulatory scheme themselves have argued “having to
navigate multiple federal and state laws makes it hard for them to
expand nationally.” 116 Others accuse fintech firms and other
sharing economy companies like AirBnB and Uber of skirting
long-standing regulations, 117 despite accommodations given by
some governmental entities to allow such companies to continue
operation outside historical regulatory frameworks. 118 Larger
fintech companies have responded to increased regulatory scrutiny
by hiring ex-regulators to serve in senior advisory positions,119
which may provide valuable expertise as well as insight into
regulated (“Both [banks and fintech firms] are looking for regulatory certainty
and healthy cooperation — all to the good of our customers.”).
113
René Lacerte, Is 2017 The Year Bank-Fintech Partnerships Hit
Product/Market
Fit?,
FORBES
(Feb.
13,
2017),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/02/13/is-2017-the-yearbank-fintech-partnerships-hit-productmarket-fit/#7fc9832a379f.
114
Id.
115
A study by Mayer Brown surveyed seventy UK financial services
providers (including banks, insurers, and asset managers), and found that 87% of
respondents were able to cut costs by working with fintech providers. 54% said
that partnerships had boosted revenue, while 83% said that collaborations
allowed respondents to refresh their branding. 54% of Incumbents Say Fintech
Partnerships Have Boosted Revenue, BUS. INSIDER: BI INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 28,
2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/54-of-incumbents-say-fintechpartnerships-have-boosted-revenue-2016-11.
116
Stashenko, supra note 89.
117
Wall, supra note 5.
118
Brittany Wallman, Uber is Back in Broward County, SUN SENTINEL, Oct.
15,
2015,
http://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fl-uber-final-vote20151013-story.html.
119
See Rudegeair, supra note 94.
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strategies to better navigate the regulatory landscape. For example,
online lender SoFi brought on former Securities and Exchange
Commission chairman Arthur Levitt.120 Former FDIC chair Sheila
Bair joined the board of directors for another lending fintech firm,
Avant.121 While bringing on ex-regulators may be viable for some
larger fintech firms, other firms will need to look for other
solutions to regulatory compliance.
B. Regtech as a Potential Solution for Regulatory Compliance
While larger companies may have the structure and funding to
attract senior ex-regulators,122 smaller and medium size firms may
find solutions in another sector of startup companies: regulation
technology or “regtech.” 123 According to the Institute for
International Finance, a research-oriented trade association in
Washington, regtech is “the use of new technologies to solve
regulatory and compliance requirements more effectively and
efficiently.”124 Kari Larsen, a former regulator at the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, described regtech as “technological
120

SoFi Surpasses $4 Billion in Funded Loans and Adds Arthur Levitt,
Former SEC Chairman, as Advisor, SOC. FIN., INC. (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.sofi.com/press/sofi-surpasses-4-billion-in-funded-loans-and-addsarthur-levitt-former-sec-chairman-as-advisor/. SoFi noted that “Levitt will
provide strategic counsel to SoFi’s executive management team as the firm
moves closer to its goal of becoming the primary financial services partner for
members.” Id.
121
Rudegeair, supra note 94. Ms. Bair also remarked “[i]nnovation got a bad
name because of some of the harmful innovations we saw during the sub-prime
mortgage craze.” Id. While serving as the FDIC chair in 2010, the agency said
that loans that Avant originated through WebBank, an FDIC-supervised bank in
Salt Lake City, mislead consumers about the credit cards it had issued on behalf
of another financial company. Id. WebBank eventually paid a $300,000 penalty
and changed it business practices, but did not admit any wrongdoing. Id.
122
“Former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers is a director
at LendingClub Corp., and Raj Date, who used to be the deputy director of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, sits on the board of Prosper Marketplace
Inc.” Rudegeair, supra note 94.
123
See Gregory Roberts, Fintech Spawns Regtech to Automate Compliance
With
Regulations,
BLOOMBERG
BNA
(June
22,
2016),
https://www.bna.com/fintech-spawns-regtech-n57982074535/.
124
van Liebergen, supra note 100.
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advancement that assists those focused on compliance and
regulatory-related activities in their professions.” 125 Regtech
includes technologies like machine learning and artificial
intelligence to help aggregate big-data, update compliance
manuals, and even model risk for bank stress testing. 126 The
industry would not be regulated like fintech firms that directly deal
with finance, but regulators could assist “in the creation of
common integrated standards.”127 Regtech tools can also be used to
improve anti-money laundering and know-your-customer
programs, as well as helping to prevent fraud and in-house
violations. 128 Utilizing regtech and other partnerships could
“becom[e] an essential element of any fintech start-up’s strategy,”
thereby improving both the profitability and efficiency of those
financial institutions.129
While regtech shows promise as an industry, the barriers to
implementation of regtech solutions are similar to those faced by
fintech firms. Restrictions on the use of data set out by data
privacy laws can curb the use or sharing of certain data or create
unstandardized data that cannot be aggregated and analyzed
automatically. 130 Protecting the security and confidentiality of
clients’ data is crucial for any financial institution, especially those
who are seeking to establish or improve customer trust. Similar to
the fintech industry, regtech firms face duplicative and overlapping
regulatory schemes making it difficult to effectively partner with
125

Roberts, supra note 49. Ms. Larson also noted that these technologies
enable “easier, swifter, more complete, more efficient [monitoring of]
compliance and regulatory obligations,” and that “[i]n her experience . . .
regulators are receptive to regtech innovations.” Id.
126
Id.
127
Imran Gulamhuseinwala et al., Innovating with RegTech: Turning
Regulatory Compliance Into a Competitive Advantage, ERNST & YOUNG
GLOBAL LIMITED 7 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EYInnovating-with-RegTech/$FILE/EY-Innovating-with-RegTech.pdf.
128
Roberts, supra note 49.
129
Marika Vilen, Fintech Partnerships Vital for Start-up Success, THOMSON
REUTERS (Jan. 5, 2017), https://blogs.thomsonreuters.com/financial-risk/fintechinnovation/fintech-partnerships-vital-start-success/.
130
van Liebergen, supra note 100, at 15.
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banks.131 However, a more streamlined regulatory scheme, with
consistent interpretation of requirements for data protection and
privacy, would make it easier for regtech firms to operate and for
financial institutions to benefit from potential partnerships.132
Despite potential challenges, regtech solutions could help
fintech companies—especially smaller firms—with the burden of
complex regulatory compliance. Regtech will allow smaller
disruptive fintech companies to assess regulatory overlaps and
minimize differing interpretations of rules and regulations. 133
Additionally, partnerships between regtech and fintech allow for
more real-time regulation management enabling companies to
adopt preemptive and proactive strategies for regulatory
compliance.134 Not only would regtech solutions help fintech firms
navigate the current regulatory landscape but they could also
continue to assist fintech companies that seek a national charter,
especially in regards to compliance and reporting obligations.135
Regardless of the outcome of the OCC’s inquiry into national
charters for fintech firms, both fintech firms and other financial
institutions will benefit from the clarity and control regtech
provides in dealing with the cumbersome and time-consuming
nature of regulation compliance.136
C. Challenges Created by the Current Landscape
The current regulatory landscape requires fintech firms to
navigate a fluctuating and overlapping mix of federal and state
regulations.137 Without the benefit of preemption provided by a
national charter, 138 fintech companies currently have to comply
131

Id. at 22.
Id. at 24.
133
Gulamhuseinwala et al., supra note 127.
134
Id.
135
See Sean Smith, RegTech is the New FinTech, DELOITTE (2016),
https://www2.deloitte.com/ie/en/pages/financial-services/articles/RegTech-isthe-new-FinTech.html.
136
See id.
137
See supra Part III, Section A.
138
For an explanation of federal and state charter preemption issues in the
context of regional and community banks utilizing fintech online delivery
132
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with different regulations in every state in which they want to
operate.139 Attempting to maintain growth and compliance across
multiple states poses multiple challenges due to expense,
dependence on other financial institutions, and constantly
fluctuating regulations.140 While some solutions exist to mitigate
these challenges, 141 they still pose a major threat to the viability
and success of the financial technology sector.
The complicated regulatory landscape is unfriendly to fintech
firms primarily because compliance is difficult and a burden on
company time and resources.142 Receiving lender licenses from all
the states can cost up to $500,000 and take over a year,143 which
may be too high for many smaller startups to effectively afford.
Many young companies may be unable to reach a point of viability
or attract interest from outside investors before the costs of
regulatory compliance doom the enterprise.144 These startups may
instead be forced to expand launch windows and “internal
compliance reviews while lawyers try to apply regulatory guidance
from traditional financial services to new and disruptive
technologies.”145 Even within a single regulatory agency, there may
systems, see generally Greg Omer, Fintech: Internet Banking Across State
Borders Triggers Compliance Challenges for State Banks, THOMPSON COBURN
LLP (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/bankcheck/post/2017-01-20/fintech-internet-banking-across-state-borders-triggerscompliance-challenges-for-state-banks.
139
See Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra
note 92.
140
See id. (noting that differences in state law can in some cases cause lenders
seeking state-by-state compliance to not lend in states with interest and fee
limitations).
141
See supra Part III, Section A.
142
Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra note
92.
143
Whalen, supra note 96.
144
See Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra
note 92. (“Rather than dealing with the hassle and expense, some firms just give
up. Consumers end up paying more or missing out on products and services
altogether.”).
145
Samuel G. Kramer, Emerging Regulatory Framework of FinTech in the
U.S.,
BAKER
MCKENZIE
(May
27,
2016),
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be inconsistent guidance between regulations, rules, operating
circulars, and policies, and as a result, fintech firms may have
difficulty determining what guidance is controlling.146 Those same
inconsistences make it increasingly burdensome for fintech
companies simply to track changes in all fifty states and the federal
government and, moreover, to adapt their products and services to
fit those new requirements.147
Aside from the regulatory mire, excitement about innovation
has chilled in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 148 Financial
innovation was once viewed positively, as “new techniques and
products made America’s financial system more resilient.” 149
However, the more recent prevailing view is that innovations like
securitization 150 exacerbated the financial crisis by “making
instruments too complex to value” through concentration of value
while spreading uncertainty over where toxic assets were
located.151 This cautionary view has persisted and has even been
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dd2b13d4-7cea-4ae1-80364dcbb6364a43.
146
Nicholas Elliot, Where Fin-Tech is Struggling with Regulation, WALL
STREET
J.
(Nov.
24,
2015,
1:28
PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2015/11/24/where-fin-tech-isstruggling-with-regulation/.
147
See Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra
note 92.
148
See Felix Salmon, How Financial Innovation Causes Crisis, REUTERS
NEWS
AGENCY
(Apr.
11,
2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felixsalmon/2010/04/11/how-financial-innovation-causes-crises/.
149
Such Seething Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25–Mar.
2, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21548232 (“True, financial creativity
is often put to unproductive ends—gaming capital regulations, for example—but
it is also needed to solve genuinely big problems.”) [hereinafter Such Seething
Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies].
150
Securitization is the bundling of mortgages into securities that were sold to
investors. This bundling of underlying assets diversified and dispersed risks, but
may have also weakened lenders’ incentives to screen out bad borrowers and to
renegotiate bad loans. Edward L. Glaeser, Debating the Securitization of
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (July 27, 2010, 6:00 AM),
https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/27/debating-the-securitization-ofmortgages/?_r=0.
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Such Seething Brains, Such Shaping Fantasies, supra note 149.

386

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 359

applied to innovations coming from financial technology
companies.152 The introduction of new financial instruments and
services poses a challenge for regulators and financial institutions
alike. A lack of market history makes it difficult for the market and
regulators to set benchmarks for the risk associated with new
products or services. 153 While some senior regulators and
politicians have expressed willingness to foster innovation and
growth, 154 the current climate is not welcoming to expanding
fintech services.
The difficulties that the crypto-currency industry encounters
serve as a perfect example of the dysfunction of the current stateby-state compliance requirements. Companies that transmit virtual
currency “typically have to first register as money transmitters in
each jurisdiction they want to operate in and second create a single
business model that complies with varying standards for factors
like net worth, bonding, and investor due diligence.”155 In order to
have the knowledge and resource to comply with the varied state
requirements, fintech companies are forced to partner with
152

See, e.g., Szu Ping Chan, Fintech “Boom” Risks Fresh “Bust” if Left
Unchecked, Warns Carney, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:50 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/01/25/fintech-boom-risks-fresh-bustleft-unchecked-warns-carney/ (“Global regulators must monitor developments in
fintech closely in order to avoid the ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ cycles that have
characterized previous advances in financial innovation.”).
153
Financial Innovation & Crises: An Executive Summary of Conference
Papers, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA (May 2009),
https://frbatlanta.org/-/media/documents/news/conferences/2009/financialmarkets-conference/conference-summary.pdf.
154
See Aaron Klein & Nicholas Montalbano, FinTech: How Can Government
Promote the Good and Protect Against the Bad?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE (Feb.
14, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/02/14/fintech-howcan-government-promote-the-good-and-protect-against-the-bad (summarizing a
Brookings Institute moderated panel of government officials and financial
industry representative that proposed actions to boost innovation and growth
include enacting real-time payments, increasing access to IRS data, and even
allowing the OCC fintech charter).
155
Lalitla Clozel, When Will Fintech Grow Up, AM. BANKER (Oct. 5, 2016,
6:00
AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/when-will-fintechregulation-grow-up.
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traditional banks, which threatens to stifle fintech companies by
forcing them to rely too heavily on traditional banking
institutions.156 According to Circle Chief Executive Jeremy Allaire,
many fintech firms would welcome a federal banking charter, as it
would take “a lot of the cost and complexity of working with many
third parties out of the equation.”157 Federal regulators have grown
increasingly concerned about these third-party relationships, and
the inability to understand certain technical innovations only made
it more difficult to police those relationships.158
The inconsistencies and differences that exist among the states
fracture the national market,159 which is extremely frustrating for
companies whose ability to offer low margin products relies in part
on their services being accessible to anyone with an internet
connection.160 The need to simultaneously fulfill requirements in so
many jurisdictions hampers fintech companies’ ability to innovate
and grow.161 In addition, consumers who are pushed away from the
mainstream financial system often seek less regulated, “alternative
financial products that charge exorbitant fees.” 162 This situation
creates negative effects for both consumers and regulatory
agencies concerned with money-laundering and other types of
fraud.163
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Witkowski & Demos, supra note 20.
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Roberts, supra note 49.
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Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra note
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(Feb.
2016),
http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/cuttingthrough-the-noise-around-financial-technology.
161
See Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra
note 92.
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Patricia Hart, Banks Are Right To Be Afraid of the FinTech Boom, TIME
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://time.com/3949469/financial-technology-boom/.
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See Jim Sivon, FinTech and the Existing Legal Framework for Anti-Money
Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing, BARNETT SIVON & NATTER
(June 2015), http://www.bsnlawfirm.com/newsletter/OP1506_Sivon.pdf.
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Lastly, state-by-state regulation means that firms forced to
comply with the laws of one state “may not offer a particular
product anywhere in response to one state’s ban, even if other
states would welcome the product.” 164 As a result, lucrative
markets like New York or California could “set the regulatory
tone” for the rest of the country, assuming that a particular product
was already approved in other states. This could deprive citizens of
the ability to hold policymakers accountable for poor regulatory
choices if they do not happen to live in a lucrative market.165 If
lucrative markets are allowed to functionally dictate stringent
requirements across the country, the overregulation could reduce
the financial products available in small states.166 This outcome
would reduce competition in those markets as well as ensure that
unbanked consumers remain unbanked.
D. Pros and Cons of the Current Regulatory Scheme
The current system of regulatory schemes for fintech firms errs
on the side of caution instead of promoting growth and fostering
innovation. The system does allow for both companies and states
to experiment and tinker with different regulations and supervisory
schemes in order to find a good fit that matches consumer needs
and safety requirements. 167 This system also provides more
accountability for lawmakers who will have more direct
accountability to the citizens of their own states.168 State agencies
are, traditionally, geographically closer to the entities they
regulate, but the lower number of institutions that they oversee
means that more time and attention could be spent on ensuring that
fintech firms receive the guidance and advice necessary to help
164

Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra note

92.

165

Id.
Id.
167
“As State regulators continue to work to foster a regulatory and
supervisory environment which promotes innovative practices in the delivery of
financial services . . . .” Ryan, supra note 87.
168
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them thrive. 169 However, since most fintech firms only have a
physical presence in one or two locations, this benefit would only
exist if firms established liaisons in each state. Traditionally, states
also have higher standards for consumer protection, and state
regulators have voiced concerns that a national charter could
preempt state-level consumer protection laws. 170 At the federal
level, the CFPB currently adopts regulations regarding consumer
finance and enforces federal consumer financial laws through legal
action. 171 As noted before, the current legislative approach is
fractured but places a high emphasis on financial stability and
consumer protection and allows a more tailored approach.172
Despite the numerous positive characteristics of the current
scheme of regulation for fintech firms, there are a multitude of
negative factors that create an environment that is ultimately
hostile to emerging companies. The primary obstacle is the
splintered nature of the current landscape, as companies are unable
to find a clear set of rules by which to operate, and instead are
forced to navigate fifty states-worth of regulations.173 The energy
and time required to deal with the multitude of schemes pulls
resources away from research and development. Those efforts
could instead be devoted to creating new financial products and
improving current ones, which would amplify the already positive
impact of fintech firms. Some experts allege that some fintech
firms have even decided that a lack of meaningful federal oversight
means that it is more advantageous to ignore the rules and focus on
growth instead.174
169
See Ryan, supra note 87 (citing concerns about the risks of a larger, more
risky, federal scheme).
170
Statement by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors on Comptroller’s
Announcement of New Federal Charters, CSBS (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.csbs.org/news/press-releases/pr2016/Pages/120216.aspx.
171
CFPB, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, STRATEGIC PLAN FY
2013–FY 2017 (Apr. 2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/strategicplan.pdf.
172
Zanki, supra note 91.
173
Clozel supra note 155.
174
Id. “‘Everybody on the road is speeding, but the question is who’s going to
get pulled over and be given a ticket,’ said Carol Van Cleef, a partner at Manatt,
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Access to internet-based financial solutions is also an important
means of increasing financial inclusion, or allowing underserved
communities to access lending and payment options that are not
often offered by traditional banking services due to margins and
risk.175 According to the World Bank’s Findex Database, which
measures financial inclusion around the world, in 2014, two billion
adults worldwide did not have a bank account. 176 Growth of
account holders in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan
Africa, has been credited to financial technology services like
mobile-based peer-to-peer payment systems. 177 According to a
study conducted by the Gates Foundation, the Better than Cash
Alliance, and the World Bank, “broader access to and participation
in the financial system can reduce income inequality, boost job
creation, accelerate consumption, increase investments in human
capital, and directly help poor people manage risk and absorb
financial shocks.”178 The current restriction of access to internetbased financial solutions is a large weakness of the current
regulatory structure, and it limits the opportunity for the financial
services to help under-developed regions of the United States.
Lastly, the ability of single states in lucrative markets to “set
the regulatory tone” for the rest of the country and to dominate the
landscape with restrictive regulation is a major negative of the
current regulatory scheme. 179 Since it is impossible for fintech
Phelps & Phillips. ‘We really need to rethink whether we should have those laws
in place if we’re not going to enforce them.’” Id.
175
Knight, Why State-by-State Fintech Oversight Doesn’t Work, supra note
92.
176
Asli Demirguc-Kunt et al., The Global Findex Database 2014, WORLD
BANK
GRP.
(Apr.
2015),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS725
5.pdf#page=3. 2014 is the most recent year for which data was published by the
World Bank Group’s Development Research Group.
177
Id.
178
Leora Klapper & Dorothe Singer, The Opportunities of Digitizing Pay,
WORLD
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GRP.
(Aug.
24,
2014),
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/~/media/GFO/Documents/What%20We%20Do
/G20%20Report_Final.pdf.
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companies to avoid these markets if they want to remain profitable,
they are forced to tailor their products to those markets and deprive
citizens in other states of the political autonomy to affect the
policies and laws that affect their lives.180 Consequently, if two
states’ regulations or policies are in conflict, financial technology
companies may well be forced to choose a state to operate in if the
cost of compliance in both is impossible. This challenge is
enhanced by the mobile nature of many fintech tools, where
products or services are not confined by a brick-and-mortar
location, and instead move freely across state lines.
In the past, some solutions have been proposed to combat the
issue of the inconsistent nature of state-by-state regulation. One
such example is section 203 of the Uniform Money Services Act,181
which permits companies that have obtained a money transmission
license under the act in one state to operate in other states that have
enacted the same or similar legislation. Unfortunately, only five
states have passed the legislation, which severely limits (and
almost completely reduces) the effectiveness of the scheme. 182
Another potential solution proffered more recently is the
“passporting”183 of state licenses. 184 This policy is already available
180

Id.
Amendments to Uniform Money Services Act, NAT’L. CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS.
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(Aug.
6,
2004),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/money%20services/umsa_am04%20fi
nal _not%20styled.pdf.
182
Judith Rinearson, Payments Innovation Wars, Part II: U.S. Strikes Back,
A M.
BANKER
(Jan.
6,
2017),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/payments-innovation-wars-part-ii-usstrikes-back-AB1093187.
183
“Passporting” allows business licenses to be recognized across state lines,
much like driver’s licenses. States engaged in passporting accept one state’s
license in their own state. See Jennifer Tesher & Jeanna Hogarth, Comments on
Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies,
CTR.
FOR
FIN.
SERVS.
INNOVATION
(Jan.
17,
2017),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/bank-operations/innovation/comments/commentcfsi.pdf.
184
Aaron Klein & Nicholas Montalbano, FinTech: How Can Government
Promote the Good and Protect Against the Bad?, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 14,
2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/02/14/fintech-how-can181
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in the EU, but a U.K. fintech firm will likely need two licenses in
order to passport after the completion of Brexit.185 While these
solutions are proposals that would help alleviate many negative
aspects of the current regulatory system, they would also remove
the ability for states to implement protections that other states may
decline to establish. Similar to the current system, single states
with lucrative markets might dominate the landscape, which would
not eliminate the political autonomy issue.
On balance, the negative consequences of the current
regulatory system combined with the unstoppable growth of the
financial technology sector means that new solutions are needed to
better serve and protect consumers, as well as encourage these
emerging companies to continue their growth and job creation. The
current regulatory landscape may have been a better fit for pre2007, when regulators already had a relationship with most
financial institutions and could trust that they would handle
innovation responsibly. 186 However, the current iteration of the
industry is comprised of both established players such as bankers,
older fintech companies, and emerging players. 187 As emerging
players continue to expand rapidly in size, the current regulatory
strategy of focusing on “too-big-to-fail” actors in order to prevent
systematic threats to the industry needs to be adjusted. Regulators
will have to work hard to identify non-traditional institutions that
can go from “too-small-to-care” to “too-big-to-fail” in a matter of
years,188 if not months.189 While all fintech companies are unlikely
government-promote-the-good-and-protect-against-the-bad/. This solution was
only backed by one of the panel’s six participants, while the rest did not express
a positive or negative opinion. Id.
185
Rinearson, supra note 182.
186
Douglas Arner et al., The Evolution of Fintech: A New Post-Crisis
Paradigm, UNIV. NEW SOUTH WALES (Oct. 20, 2015, last revised Sept. 7, 2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2676553.
187
Id.
188
For an example of how explosive fintech growth can be, Alibaba’s money
fund Yu-E Bao (“Leftover Treasure”), grew from 0 to 578 billion yuan (around
$78 billion at today’s exchange rate) in less than two years. Madison Marriage,
Huge Growth in China’s Money Funds Poses Risk, FIN. TIMES (June 14, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/14/-in-chinas-money-funds-poses-risk.html.
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to reach the “too-big-to-fail” level so quickly, “in an ever
interconnected financial system, market size and systemic risk are
not necessarily correlated. The Dow Jones flash crash in May 2010
illustrated that smaller players can also become systemic.”190 The
current regulatory landscape does allow for a balance of consumer
protection and experimentation, but sacrifices financial inclusivity
and innovation, a trade-off that could stand to be improved.
IV.

THE FUTURE FOR FINTECH: A NEW REGULATORY
LANDSCAPE
Today’s regulatory scheme simply lags behind other countries
in the way innovation is regulated,191 despite initial attempts to
implement regulatory sandboxes and other regulatory reforms. The
President of the American Bankers Association, Rob Nichols,
wrote: “Our regulators can learn much from Britain about how to
stimulate new ideas from outside banking and to integrate them
under a common set of regulatory expectations.”192 However, the
future of fintech should not be a complex reorganization of the
banking system that forgoes a focus on safety and soundness for a
Wild West setting full of experimentation in search of exponential
profits. Instead, reasonable reforms can be made to ensure that the
proper regulatory authorities provide the necessary safeguards to
contain the risk of innovation, without unnecessarily stifling it. The
result could be a system where banks and other financial services
incumbents partner with fintech firms to generate value, while
189

The concept of “too-small-to-care” to “too-big-to-fail” was initially
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increasing financial inclusion and innovation without sacrificing
stability or consumer protections.
A. The OCC as the Primary Supervisor for Fintech Firms
The creation of a special purpose charter for fintech companies
would represent a drastic change from the current regulatory
landscape that confronts fintech companies. A charter granted by
the OCC would allow fintech companies to avoid the current maze
of regulation through the pre-emption of many state-by-state
requirements. 193 In exchange for having to seek state-by-state
approval for many financial practices, fintech companies would
instead be subject to a rigorous, multi-layered scheme of federal
regulation that is likely stricter than, and possibly as complex as,
the state-by-state system.194 This layered scheme means that the
OCC would need to work in tandem with not only other federal
regulators, but also with state authorities in some instances.
However, in the words of the head of the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, Thomas Curry, “[i]t will be much better for the
health of the federal banking system and everyone who relies on
those institutions, if these companies enter the system through a
clearly marked front gate, rather than through some back door.”195
Some industry advocates have lauded the OCC’s recent plans,
noting that special purpose charters would be an “elegant way to
ensure that important prudential and consumer protection standards

193
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Jeffrey Hale, et al., The OCC Confirms Special Purpose National Bank
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are consistently maintained while allowing new entrants to bring
valuable, innovative products to market.”196
While the OCC is the primary supervisor of national banks, it
shares some responsibilities with other federal and state agencies.
Some of those responsibilities have shifted in the aftermath of
Dodd-Frank and recent court decisions. For example, the OCC was
once thought to have exclusive visitorial powers for national banks
stemming from 12 U.S.C. § 484, an interpretation once solidified
in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. 197 This authority was challenged in
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.,198 and the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a state attorney general was allowed to bring suit
against national banks to enforce non-preempted state laws. 199
While state regulators would need to sue in order to get access to
info about internal operations of national banks, the decision did
signal a slight weakening of the OCC’s power over national
banks.200 In wake of the decision, some argued it could disrupt the
“system of consistent nationwide banking regulation”201 that the
OCC is tasked with providing. This disruption may make entry
into the national banking field less attractive for potential entrants
like fintech firms, but all that can be stated for sure is that the
ruling created additional tension within the national banking
system. 202 The ruling affirms that states regulatory authorities
196

Blair Bernstein, BAFT Releases Statement on Potential Creation of OCC
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https://baft.org/events/general/2016/12/05/baft-releases-statement-on-potentialcreation-of-occ-fintech-charter.
197
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2710, 2714 (2009).
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Id. at 528 n.2, 129 S. Ct. at 2717.
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See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 523, 129 S. Ct. at 2714 (2009) (affirming that the
OCC regulation claiming to pre-empt state law enforcement was not a
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maintain an important role in the policing of national banks.203 For
example, state regulations regarding usury, or barring loans above
certain interest rates, are a bulwark against abusive lending
practices that often target vulnerable populations who do not have
regular access to credit. 204 Regardless of other regulatory
authorities, the OCC remains the primary supervisor of federal
banks. It is responsible for monitoring, inspecting, and examining
banks to ensure that they comply with applicable rules and
regulations and operate in a safe and sound manner.205
B. Other Agencies and Laws: Secondary Regulation
The OCC functions as a day-to-day supervisor of national
banks, but three other federal bodies serve to oversee financial
activity at a higher level. First, the Federal Reserve Board (“Fed”)
provides direct supervision of bank and financial holding
companies,206 any non-banking subsidiary not directly regulated by
another state or federal regulator, and state non-member banks.207
In the context of a special national bank charter, the Fed would
banking system, especially in the current climate of popular distrust and even
animosity toward banks in general.” Malick, supra note 201, at 509 (citing See
David A. Scheffel, The National Bank Act: So Much for Preemption, N.Y.L.J.,
(Aug. 3, 2009) at 1).
203
See Cuomo, 557 U.S. at 536, 129 S. Ct. at 2721 (state authorities can bring
lawsuits to enforce state law against national banks, acting in the role of
“sovereign-as-law-enforcer”).
204
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205
THE FED. RESERVE, SUPERVISING AND REGULATING FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES, https://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf
(last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
206
A bank holding company (“BHC”) is a corporate structure used to control
a bank for regulatory and risk-separation purposes. A financial holding company
(“FHC”) is a BHC that through the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 can
engage in additional activities such as securities underwriting, insurance
underwriting, and insurance agency activities. THE FEDERAL RESERVE,
SUPERVISING AND REGULATING FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND ACTIVITIES
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_5.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2017).
207
See Bank Holding Companies and Financial Holding Companies, BOARD
OF
GOVERNORS
OF
THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE
SYSTEM,
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/grow-shareholder-value/bankholding-companies#03d (last visited Mar. 5, 2017).

APRIL 2017]

More Sense than Money

397

likely only interact with a fintech firm on the overarching policy
level. Second, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”)
is a formal interagency body that includes federal and state
regulators, as well as Fed representatives, and is tasked with
identifying and responding to emerging threats to U.S. financial
stability. 208 It is unlikely that the FSOC would have cause to
interact with fintech firms unless they grew exponentially in size or
were so crucial to the interconnection of financial institutions that
their failure would threaten the stability of the U.S. financial
system.209 Lastly, the CFPB is a federal agency responsible for
implementing and enforcing compliance with consumer finance
laws, and overseeing financial products and services.210
The OCC works in tandem with the FDIC, which is an
independent agency created by Congress to insure deposits and
examine some large banking institutions such as financial holding
companies. 211 While many of the banks that fintech companies
partner with are national banks regulated by the OCC, the FDIC
requires a separate application from the OCC’s chartering process
in order to obtain deposit insurance. 212 “The FDIC requires a
thorough, well-developed business plan that is ‘tailored to the
institution’s size, complexity and risk profile’ and that ‘present[s] a
sustainable franchise.’” 213 The FDIC serves as a secondary
supervisor, especially for those institutions who deal in
208

See Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx.
209
See About FSOC, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (June 23, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx.
210
See The Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCE PROTECTION BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/ (last visited Mar. 28,
2017).
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Mission, Vision, and Values, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (May 15, 2015),
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212
Franca Gutierrez, et al., Fintech Regulation: Recent Developments and
Innovations,
LAW360
(May
9,
2016,
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AM),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publicatio
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marketplace lending, supplementing work done by the OCC.214
Despite its secondary status, the FDIC has recently mentioned that
the online lending activities may draw increased scrutiny, and that
it may pursue enforcement actions if those activities generate too
much risk.215 The FDIC has recently formed committees focused
on the retail and wholesale applications of fintech, suggesting that
the regulator intends to be more closely involved in supervising the
institutions. 216 Regardless of the FDIC’s final role in fintech
supervision, their involvement creates another element that fintech
businesses will have to consider.
An important piece of legislation that fintechs may encounter is
the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”).217 The CRA’s
purpose is “require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory
agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions,
to encourage such institutions to help meet the credit needs of the
local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the
safe and sound operation of such institutions.”218 The law is limited
to depository intuitions, but according to an OCC spokesperson,
“[t]he OCC has the ability to condition approvals (of nonbank
charters) to require compliance and activities consistent with laws

214

“Online marketplace lending refers to the segment of the financial services
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(May
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2016),
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215
Gutierrez, supra note 212.
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Gregory Roberts, Fintech Poses No. 1 Threat to Community Banks, Execs
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requiring “require each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency to use
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institutions to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they
are chartered consistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions”).
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See 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (2012).
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like the CRA . . . .”219 However, a key provision in the CRA means
that it applies to a certain geographic area, which may require
fintech banks to use “strategic plans” similar to those used by
Internet banks with no physical branches.220 Some industry experts
have asserted that this could serve as another barrier to entry for
fintech firms considering national charters. 221 However some
politicians argue that fintech companies could reinvigorate the
CRA, and stimulate a new emphasis on financial inclusion.222
Other prudential regulators, such as the CFPB and the FTC,
could potentially impose additional regulation on fintech banks.223
The CFPB was created by Dodd-Frank in 2010 as an independent
regulatory agency with rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement
authority over nearly all firms involved in consumer financial
services, irrespective of their particular legal form.224 The CFPB,
which “aims to make consumer financial markets work for
consumers and responsible providers,” recently announced a policy
219
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220
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222
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Make CRA Relevant Again, AMERICAN BANKER (Jan. 18, 2017, 9:40 AM),
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-occs-fintech-plan-can-make-crarelevant-again. Rep. Gregory W. Meeks, D-N.Y., is a senior member of the
House Financial Services Committee. Id. Rep. Cedric Richmond, D-LA., is
chair of the Congressional Black Caucus. Id.
223
Gutierrez, supra note 212.
224
Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An
Introduction, 32 REVIEW OF BANKING & FIN. LAW 321, 322 (2012-2013),
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where bureau staff is allowed to issue no-action letters to
applicants with proposals for innovative financial products.225 The
CFPB plays an important role in the oversight of consumer
protection regulations, but the agencies’ role could be reduced by
the current Republican administration that has accused the agency
of overreaching its authority.226 If the CFPB were forced to reduce
its activities, it would create a prime opportunity for state
regulators to reassert themselves and fill the role of protecting
consumers. 227 The FTC is likely to fill gaps in the federal
regulatory scheme, but could also deploy its powerful law
enforcement tools in its new focus on consumer protection risks in
the fintech industry.228
Lastly, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
could make further adjustments to its crowdfunding regulations,
which would affect many fintech firms whose funds come from
varied sources. 229 The SEC’s mission is to oversee “the key
participants in the securities world, including securities exchanges,
securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual
funds. Here, the SEC is concerned primarily with promoting the
disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining
fair dealing, and protecting against fraud.”230 The SEC has also
seen an opening to regulate fintech firms, with Commissioner
Michael Piwowar stating that “[he] believe[s] the commission
should take the lead regulatory role in the fintech space.”231 Many
225
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226
Telis Demos & Rachel Witkowski, States to Feds: Back Off on New
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fintech firms are already registered with the SEC in a variety of
capacities and are familiar with the agency.232 The SEC already
seeks to “ensure that marketplace lending investors are given
enough information to make good investment decisions,” and
could regulate fintech firms that operate in marketplace lending.233
This position conflicts with the OCC’s stance on the matter, but
many fintech firms are already registered with the SEC in a variety
of capacities.234 The SEC argues that their agency has a role to play
in regulating marketplace lending and firms that use distributed
ledgers to facilitate financial transactions, as well as those who use
automated investment advisors to give disclosures to clients.235 The
OCC’s chartering authority may ensure that some fintech firms fall
under its purview, but it seems clear that the SEC will have at least
some role in fintech’s future.
C. Pros and Cons of a New Landscape
Despite the complexity that may come with fintech firms being
granted special purpose charters, the potential benefits to the
banking system, potential entrants, and consumers far outweigh
any potential negative effects. A primary benefit of granting
fintech firms access to the national regulatory scheme would be
increased competition with older, more established financial
firms. 236 While some fintech firms perceive competition with

232
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traditional institutions as a core mission, 237 some of those
traditional institutions (and many others) argue that more benefit
could be derived from cooperation between the two industries.238A
single license would make it easier for many companies to do
business,239 while those who did not want to seek a national charter
could stick with the current system. Those who forgo the current
system could still take advantage of potential developments
regarding passporting and regtech, especially if they are smaller
companies who could not afford the costs of a national bank
charter. While this dual national charter and state-by-state
approach seems counter to the idea of a consistent regulatory
scheme, the dual-regulation scheme has been a “hallmark of
cooperative federalism.”240 The larger, established companies who
arguably are most in need of a more structured regulatory scheme
could voluntarily apply for a charter, while smaller firms could
take advantage of the state-by-state approach. Fintech firms
specializing in payment processing could avoid partnerships with
existing national banks, and instead divert the funds expended on
that enterprise for growth and expansion. The OCC’s previous
experience in regulating risky companies and dealing with
systemic risk would serve it well in dealing with fintech firms, and
it could even “leverag[e] the work of the National Risk
Committee”241 to augment their experience.242
237
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Recently, legislatures across the world 243 have begun to
introduce a system where fintech companies could “work
alongside a regulator when testing a fintech product or service.”244
These systems termed “regulatory sandboxes,” and give firms a
place to test new products or business models without the need for
completing the full regulatory process. 245 The sandboxes often
allow innovative business to operate exempt from some rules, after
being vetted by regulators. 246 Globally, sandboxes vary in the
amount of leeway given to fintech firms, with some countries like
Hong Kong only allowing banks who utilize fintech to
participate.247 Other countries like Singapore, Australia, and Britain
have established incubators that encourage more fintech firms,
including startups, to experiment. 248 Some U.S. politicians like
Rep. Patrick McHenry (R., N.C.) have pushed for a regulatory
sandbox option in order to prevent fintech firms from finding more
attractive regulatory environments overseas.249 However, detractors
recommended actions to address such issues.” The Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, Fiscal Year 2017 Bank Supervision Operating Plan (2017),
https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2016/nr-occ-2016-112a.pdf.
242
Gutierrez, supra note 212.
243
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(Oct.
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2016),
https://www.law360.com/articles/853780/malaysian-central-bank-forms-fintechregulatory-sandbox. Malaysia has followed the example of other Asian countries
like Hong Kong and Singapore, while the U.K. has been noted as a global
leading in pushing fintech sandboxes. Id.
244
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argue that a sandbox would only add to a fragmented regulatory
system if multiple government agencies each had their own
innovation office.250 While little progress has currently made in
establishing a fully realized sandbox in the U.S., some federal
regulators, like the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
(“CFTC”) acting chair, have signaled an interest in establishing the
regulatory framework.251 Thomas Curry, current Comptroller of the
Currency, hasn’t wholly embraced the sandbox approach, recently
stating that, “we are not talking about giving you a carte blanche,
get-out-of-jail-free card in terms of consumer products that may
result in harm to individual consumers.”252 He did indicate that the
OCC’s Office of Innovation would work with firms to vet product
and technology ideas “in a controlled setting” to limit potential
liability.253 The office will allow the OCC and banks it already
supervises to experiment with new technology before it hits the
market, and understand how a new product interacts with “existing
regulations and implications to the safety and soundness of
banks.”254 While this may be a step in the right direction, it seems
for now that a fully realized fintech sandbox is not in the cards, and
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/innovation-will-stall-without-aregulatory-fintech-sandbox (arguing that a U.S. sandbox is necessary to
encourage innovation without jeopardizing consumers).
250
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251
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instead government agencies like the OCC will experiment with a
more restrictive version of a sandbox.
In summary, this new system would strike a balance between
“encouraging innovation while extending traditional protections to
new financial products that have boomed since the financial
crisis.”255 Despite concerns voiced by state-level regulators, a new
system of regulation could ensure that state-level consumer
protection laws are not pre-empted, which would create better
protection of consumers due to the overlay of state and federal
protection. 256 However, it would still be important that states
attempt to institute reforms of their own in order to make a nonnational charter option friendlier to growing fintech firms. As
mentioned previously, important reforms would include
passporting and potentially regulatory sandboxes, which would
help make the state-by-state option more viable for smaller
companies.257 Lastly, as mentioned previously, fintech companies
have incredible potential to expand access to credit and help reach
underserved and unbanked populations.258
Creating a new regulatory scheme may have overwhelming
positive effects, but there would undoubtedly be negative
repercussions. State-level regulators have been quick to point out
255
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that the OCC’s unilateral decision to consider national bank
charters for fintech firms is absent statutory authorization. 259
Additionally, the same regulators have voiced concerns that “the
creation of a federal charter for fintech or other nonbanking
companies would put the OCC in the position of picking winners
and losers among providers of fintech services, to the general
detriment of customers and innovative financial services
providers.”260 Despite assurances to the contrary, the creation of a
federal system could preempt state consumer protection laws, like
the ones that served to combat predatory lending261 in the absence
of a comparable federal scheme leading up to the 2008 financial
crisis.262 Additionally, the OCC’s creation of new charter types
could violate the traditional separation of banking and commerce263
and predispose the financial system to another catastrophic
depression, this time precipitated by risk-seeking, growth-oriented
companies. Finally, the granting of a charter to fintech firms could
adversely affect full service banks who franchise their charters for
programs managed by nonbank fintech companies and state
banking departments who depend on revenue from regulated
institutions.
259
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Rule on Receiverships for Uninsured National Banks (Nov. 14, 2016),
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%20Banks%20NPRM.pdf.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of the point in the future when fintech companies
gain the ability to apply for national charters, the industry will
continue to innovate, grow, and disrupt traditional financial fields.
Millennials, an increasingly large part of the population, will
continue to rely on internet-based banking options for peer-to-peer
payments, loans, and wealth management. While a national charter
for fintech companies may have some drawbacks, and may not be
the best option for smaller companies, the increased regulation,
uniformity, and transparency that come with the charter will
benefit consumers and regulators alike. Our regulatory system
needs to advance to accommodate an ever-increasing wave on
companies who cannot be managed by the traditional geographic
barriers that have long governed financial institution regulation.
With a national special purpose charter option, companies will
be able to continue to innovate and create new financial products
that increase competition and deliver better rates and services to
consumers, all while being supported by a robust regulatory
structure that will ensure these companies do not endanger their
customers’ funds or the financial system. The grant of special
purpose charters places fintech companies on a more equal playing
field with traditional banking entities, many of whom are
attempting to respond to the increased competition by investing in
fintech products themselves. Despite the battle lines already being
drawn by state banking regulators due to their financial interest in
continuing to regulate fintech firms, and the flurry of lawsuits that
are sure to follow, the OCC’s decision to potentially issue national
bank charters to fintech companies is the correct choice for fintech
companies, consumers, and the financial industry as a whole.
The decision to grant national charters should not focus on the
economics of the situation, or the threat that fintech firms may
pose to traditional banking institutions. Fintech is a growing
industry, and the United States should seize the opportunity to lead
the development of a new, job-creating industry. While the recent
change in administration could signal “a real possibility for a
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significant overhaul of financial services regulation,”264 there is still
hope that federal regulators will be able to move forward with
plans to incorporate the fintech industry into the financial
landscape. The decision to grant a national charter to fintech
companies is about what makes the most sense for consumer
protection, competition in the marketplace, cost-saving for
traditional players, and regulators. The recent step taken by the
OCC in explaining how it would apply licensing standards and
requirements in existing regulations to fintech companies is a
promising one, 265 and indicates that momentum behind the
proposal is substantial. Hopefully, the financial services
community and the new administration will embrace the sensible
choice over specific financial interests.
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